A typical wireless sensor node has little protection against radio jamming. The situation becomes worse if energy-efficient jamming can be achieved by exploiting knowledge of the data link layer. Encrypting the packets may help to prevent the jammer from taking actions based on the content of the packets, but the temporal arrangement of the packets induced by the nature of the protocol might unravel patterns that the jammer can take advantage of, even when the packets are encrypted.
INTRODUCTION
Jamming-style DoS attacks on the physical and data link layer of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have recently attracted attention Vantran 2003; Xu et al. 2004 Xu et al. , 2005 . In particular, Xu et al. [2005] propose four generic jammer models, namely: (1) the constant jammer, (2) the deceptive jammer, (3) the random jammer, and (4) the reactive jammer. A constant jammer emits a constant noise; a deceptive jammer either fabricates or replays valid signals on the channel incessantly; a random jammer sleeps for a random time and jams for a random time; and lastly, a reactive jammer listens for activity on the channel, and in case of activity, immediately sends out a random signal to collide with the existing signal on the channel. According to Xu et al. [2005] , constant jammers, deceptive jammers, and reactive jammers are effective in that they can cause the packet delivery ratio to fall to zero or almost zero, if they are placed within a suitable distance from the victims. However these jammers are also energy inefficient, meaning they would exhaust their energy sooner than their victims would when given comparable energy budgets. Although random jammers save energy by sleeping, they are less effective.
Our contribution is to develop jamming attacks that: (1) work on encrypted packets, (2) are as effective as constant/deceptive/reactive jamming, and (3) at the same time are more energy efficient than random jamming or reactive jamming. We implement such jamming attacks by exploiting the semantics of the data link layer and show the results quantitatively. The fact that our attacks are applicable to three representative MAC protocols suggests the same attacks are applicable to a wide range of other protocols belonging to the same categories as these protocols. Our analysis of the attacks provides new insights into the timing considerations of MAC protocols with regards to security, and provides hints on which category of protocols provides the best protection against our attacks so far, in the absence of effective countermeasures. This article is an extension of our previous work .
The motivation of this work stems from the concern that if an attacker can program and deploy a general-purpose link-layer jamming network that is able to jam any WSN effectively and energy efficiently, and if a high entry barrier is not maintained for such a low-cost attack, a WSN can never in any practical sense be secure. A counter-argument might be that energy efficiency is of no concern to powerful attackers, but even powerful jammers come with a finite Energy-Efficient Link-Layer Jamming Attacks against WSN MAC Protocols • 6:3 energy supply. We offer further justifications of our work.
(1) How the WSN is deployed partly determines the attacker model, and whether an attacker can be all powerful. For example, an attacker can attack a smart card by collecting as many cards as it likes, taking them home and spending endless hours breaking them; a WSN deployed in an human-inaccessible area, however, cannot be attacked this way. (2) In the theory of cryptography, an attacker is modeled as a probabilistic polynomial-time bounded algorithm, instead of a nondetermistic, computationally unbounded algorithm [Goldreich 2001] , because the former is more realistic. By the same token, in jamming attacks, an attacker should be modeled as energetically bounded instead of unbounded. (3) There is no defense in WSNs against an all-powerful attacker, so any analysis on this basis would be uninteresting. Although this may not be the case in the future, what we actually do is to figure out how powerful the jammer has to be at least.
The article is organized as follows. We start by stating the assumptions on which our attacks are based in Section 2. We then describe the attack algorithms in Section 3. Section 4 describes how the protocols and corresponding attacks are simulated, and how the results are evaluated. The results are given in Section 6. Implications of our work for other protocols are discussed in Section 7. Section 8 explores some potential countermeasures. In Section 9 we focus on one MAC protocol in particular: the LMAC protocol. We discuss the implementation of an efficient jammer for this protocol on prototype node hardware and we explore the effectiveness of our LMAC countermeasure. Experiments are used to validate our simulation model for a small topology. Related work is discussed in Section 10. Finally Section 11 concludes.
ASSUMPTIONS
In our attacker model, the attacker: (1) has bounded energy, (2) has bounded transmission range, and (3) cannot cover the deployment area of the WSN all at once.
We assume an attacker has two goals: The primary goal is to disrupt the network by preventing messages from arriving at the sink node, and the secondary goal is to increase the energy wastage of the sensors. A sink node is a node that requests, and hence sinks, information. Our attacks depend on three assumptions: (1) the jammer motes know the preamble 1 used by the victim nodes, (2) the jammer motes can measure the length of a packet, and (3) the jammer motes know what MAC protocol the victim nodes are running.
Requirements (1) and (2) should be easy to satisfy in practice. Requirement (3) is more demanding, but not impractical to satisfy; as our future work, a strategy will be devised to map observed traffic to specific classes of protocols. Note that the jammer motes do not need to know the content of the packets, so 6:4
• Y. W. Law et al. our attacks work even if the packets are encrypted. Adding to the significance of our attacks is that the attacker does not need to capture and compromise any existing sensor nodes.
We now describe the concrete set of circumstances under which our attack scenario is applicable.
-The attacker does not know where the sinks are located, for example, when the sinks are well hidden or mobile, and when countermeasures have been set up so that the sinks' locations cannot be deduced by traffic analysis [Deng et al. 2006] . In applications where security is important, we assume the network deployer would at least take the minimal precaution of protecting the sinks. -It is infeasible for the attacker to deploy its nodes strategically, except perhaps to air-drop them on top of the target network. -The attacker can only estimate where and not how the target network is or would be deployed. -The target network is protected with a link-layer authentication (and optionally encryption) scheme like TinySec [Karlof et al. 2004] .
Where these assumptions apply, the attacker would find it appealing to distribute its jammer motes among the target WSN and apply our jamming attacks. Our attack scenario is based on the hypothesis that the network deployer has done its part to protect the accessibility of the sinks, and it is up to the attacker to attack the network without knowing where the sinks are. In the case that the sinks' locations are known, a successful attack boils down to just isolating the sinks, or destroying the sinks altogether. However, this latter scenario seriously limits the scope of security countermeasure that can be put in place, and is the foremost reason why the network deployer should protect the sinks' locations in the first place. Our motivation is to provide a reasonable scenario where our attacks can be used, so that we can evaluate and provide countermeasures to our attacks. We are in fact not alone in suggesting this attack scenario [Noubir 2004] . One note of caution, though, is that if the target network employs frequency-hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) [Adamy and Adamy 2004] , the attacker would find it necessary to deploy an intercept receiver (interceptor for short) to calculate the FHSS parameters first before its network of jammer motes can start jamming (see Figure 1 ). Detailed information on how to attack FHSS as used in a WSN can be found in Appendix A. Naturally, our attacks are affected by the choice of values assigned to the protocol parameters. Throughout the article, we pick values for the protocol parameters that are either as realistic or as faithful to what the creators of the protocols recommend as possible, in the absence of a universal consensus and a scientifically rigorous way of deriving these values.
MAC PROTOCOLS FOR WSNS
Before we describe our attacks, a brief overview of MAC protocols for WSNs is in order. Despite the number of protocols proposed so far, there is still no clear indication of the mechanisms the proposals are converging to [Langendoen and Energy-Efficient Link-Layer Jamming Attacks against WSN MAC Protocols Halkes 2005]. However, since different applications require optimizing different parameters, there will most likely not be a single solution that fits all types of applications. According to Langendoen and Halkes [2005] survey, WSN MAC protocols can be classified according to: (1) the number of channels used, (2) how the intended receiver of a message is notified, and (3) how medium accesses are temporally organized.
In terms of channels, most protocols use only a single channel, for example, S-MAC [Ye et al. 2002 [Ye et al. , 2003 ], LMAC , and B-MAC [Polastre et al. 2004] .
In terms of message notification, in some protocols, a communication scheduling algorithm determines when a node listens for messages to minimize energy consumed by idle listening. This type of protocol is typically either more resource demanding or requires architectural support [Kulkarni and Arumugam 2004; Li and Lazarou 2004; Rajendran et al. 2003 ]. In other protocols, a node has to determine on its own when to listen for messages. To reduce energy spent on idle listening, these protocols typically employ some form of sleep-listen schedule. Since they are more lightweight and hence more viable for current WSNs, we concentrate on this type of protocol, of which S-MAC, LMAC, and B-MAC are, again, well-known and widely used examples.
In terms of temporal organization of medium accesses, S-MAC, LMAC, and B-MAC belong to different categories. S-MAC divides time into slots, and nodes contend for slots to send packets. LMAC divides time into frames, and each node is allocated a slot in the frame to send packets. B-MAC uses random accesses to the communication medium, that is, no slots and no frames, to send packets.
Based on the preceding analysis, S-MAC, LMAC, and B-MAC are representative of current WSN MAC protocols, and our jamming analysis in the following will hence be targeted at these protocols. What follows is a brief introduction to each of the protocols.
S-MAC
The design of S-MAC revolves around a periodic sleep-listen schedule. A period is divided into a listen interval and a sleep interval. The listen interval in turn consists of a SYNC interval and a CTRL interval. The sleep interval allows the nodes to sleep in order to reduce the amount of energy spent on idle listening. The ratio of the length of the listen interval to the length of the period is the duty cycle. Lowering the duty cycle based on a fixed period reduces energy usage.
We now describe the operation of S-MAC. When a node A first joins a network, it listens for a whole period. If the channel is clear, A broadcasts its schedule in a SYNC packet, telling its neighbors that it will sleep t s seconds later, marking the end of A's listen interval. If a node B receives A's schedule before choosing its own, B will adopt A's schedule and after a random delay of t d seconds, broadcast to tell A and other neighbors that it will sleep at t s − t d seconds later. Should B receive A's schedule after broadcasting its own, it adopts both schedules [Ye et al. 2003 ]. In this way, A, B, and their neighbors are able to synchronize their schedules.
Data packets are mainly sent during the CTRL interval, and may extend into the sleep interval. When broadcast, data packets are sent without the exchange of RTS/CTS packets (RTS = Request-To-Send, CTS = Clear-To-Send). When unicast, RTS/CTS packets are exchanged. Collision avoidance depends solely on carrier sense and the use of network allocation vectors [Ye et al. 2003 ].
LMAC
LMAC is a TDMA protocol. In LMAC, time is divided into frames which are further divided into time slots. In each frame, a sensor node takes control of one time slot (or more, for instance, in a variant of LMAC called AI-LMAC [Chatterjea et al. 2004]) . A time slot is further divided into two parts of unequal length: (1) a control part for transmitting a control packet, and (2) a data part for transmitting a data packet. In the time slot it controls, a node always starts by sending out a control packet even if it does not have any data to send. Besides addressing other nodes, the control packet is also necessary for maintaining synchronization. When the neighbors of the node discover by listening to the control packet that they are not the intended receivers, or that the node simply has no data to send, they immediately turn off their receivers and sleep until the next slot.
The neighbor addressed by the control packet stays listening. The data packet is transmitted right after the control packet. The absence of RTS/CTS signalling makes LMAC a particularly energy-efficient protocol; however, tight time synchronization is required.
B-MAC
The central feature of B-MAC is its preamble sampling scheme, called lowpower listening (LPL), which is a continuation of a tradition set by El-Hoiydi [2000] and Hill and Culler [2002] . As one of the main sources of energy wastage in WSNs is idle listening, a simple solution is to listen and sleep periodically according to some duty cycle. The requirement for monitoring-type applications [Mainwaring et al. 2002] to reduce the duty cycle to 1% (i.e., listen for 1% of an entire cycle) means that the sensor nodes should listen for the briefest time possible. Preamble sampling achieves this by delegating to the transmitter the responsibility of making sure the receiver receives the packet, in that the transmitter must transmit a preamble that is long enough to be sensed by the receiver, which only wakes up for the briefest moment and sleeps most of the time (see Figure 2 ). Note that this is different from S-MAC in that the sender and receiver are not synchronized.
Unlike S-MAC or LMAC, B-MAC is only a link protocol in that it does not stipulate how the communication medium is shared between nodes. However, it is reasonable to assume RTS/CTS signaling is used. When RTS/CTS signaling is used, the sender sends an RTS packet with an LPL preamble. Upon detecting this long preamble, the receiver snaps out of the LPL mode, and replies with a CTS packet that has a normal preamble, since the sender is already listening and waiting. The ensuing data packet and acknowledgement packet exchanged between the sender and receiver are all transmitted with a normal preamble. After sending the acknowledgement packet, the receiver returns to the LPL mode.
This concludes our summary of the most widely used MAC protocols in WSNs.
DESCRIPTION OF ATTACKS
Imagine we are the attacker; the question now is how do we attack a protocol without knowing the content of the packets? A common suggestion is to simply jam the packet headers. However, the point is not whether to jam packet headers but how to predict when these packets are sent so that they can be destroyed just in time. From a functional viewpoint, the attacker is solely interested in jamming data packets; our first observation is that since data packets are longer than control packets, we can focus on jamming long packets. We can do this by sorting packets according to their length and predicting when long packets would arrive. This strategy might not work, however, because: (1) data packets might be generated spontaneously, rendering our prediction inaccurate; and (2) data packets are sparse, for example, 1 packet every 5 minutes from each node [Mainwaring et al. 2002] . Sparse packets require us to observe for a long time before we get a working prediction model, and offer us few opportunities to readjust our prediction. A more promising approach is to look at the probability distribution of the interarrival times between packets, that is, packets of all types. We look at S-MAC, LMAC, and B-MAC in turn. Figure 3 shows the probability distribution of the packet interarrival times observed by a node, which has 6 neighbors that send data to a sink multiple hops away every 5 s, in a static network using S-MAC with a period of 930 ms and a duty cycle of 10% (i.e., default values that come with the original S-MAC source code). There are 2 clusters in the graph. Let us call them cluster1 and cluster2. Although using different data packet lengths results in different shapes of the clusters (e.g., distinct spikes in cluster1 in Figure 3 (a) in contrast to Figure 3(b) ), the clear separation between the clusters still stands. These two clusters can also be observed even if the nodes are mobile.
S-MAC
These clusters are not due to the periodic nature of data reporting by the nodes; in fact, they are solely the result of the periodic nature of the protocol: in this case S-MAC itself. The explanation is as follows. In S-MAC, packets within a period are closely spaced in time, accounting for the interarrival times in cluster1. Two packets from two different periods are more widely spaced because of the sleep interval, and the interarrival time between these two packets falls in cluster2. Unless the nodes insist on sending only 1 packet every period, which is improbable, it is only natural that cluster1 has a larger weight, or higher probability, than cluster2. Observe that cluster2 has a larger variance than cluster1. One way to understand this is to compare two cluster2 interarrival times: The time separation between two SYNC packets of two consecutive periods is large, but the time separation between an acknowledgement packet and a SYNC packet of the subsequent period is small. Yet these two time separations belong to cluster2. Actually, there are other clusters at the further end of the time axis, but their probability is negligible. They have to be filtered out in order for clustering to work. It is reasonable, for example, to expect S-MAC to have a maximum period of 1 s (otherwise the latency would be large), thus filtering all interarrival times larger than 1.5 s should eliminate these unwanted clusters.
Our S-MAC attack strategy follows from the following deduction. If, according to observation, for every cluster2 interarrival time there are c cluster1 interarrival times, then right after observing a cluster2 interarrival time, we should expect around c cluster1 interarrival times (see Figure 4(a) ). Denote the means of cluster1 and cluster2 interarrival times as μ 1 and μ 2 , respectively. A straightforward strategy is to first collect a reasonable number (e.g., 64) of consecutive interarrival times, and then perform clustering on them. The result Energy-Efficient Link-Layer Jamming Attacks against WSN MAC Protocols (1) wait until a single cluster2 interarrival time, T 1 , is observed; (2) jam with c packets, with a space of μ 1 s in between; (3) sleep for μ 2 s; (4) repeat the cycle starting from step 2.
This strategy, however, does not work in practice because μ 2 is often not a good approximation of T 2 due to the large variance of cluster2. An improvement is to estimate T p instead, because T p is a close approximation of the period, which is constant. Our improved strategy is thus to (see Figure 4 (c)):
(1) wait until a single cluster2 interarrival time is observed and record arrival time as t 1 ; (2) wait for another cluster2 interarrival time and record arrival time as t 2 .
Calculate the period T p = t 2 − t 1 . Record length of packet in time (not in bytes, as with all packet lengths that appear hereafter) just received as L p ; (3) set t marker = current time -L p . Jam with c − 1 packets, with a space of μ 1 s in between. (Notice where this step starts in Figure 4 (c).) (4) sleep until t marker + T p ; (5) set t marker = current time. Jam with c packets, with a space of μ 1 s in between; and (6) repeat the cycle starting from step 4.
Periodic re-estimation is done by repeating the cycle starting from step (1) instead of step (4). We call this approach periodic clustering-based jamming (PCJ), and depending on the context we also use PCJ to mean a periodic clusteringbased jammer.
Additionally, we propose RPCJ, a reactive version of PCJ, by modifying step (3) of PCJ. In step (3) of RPCJ, the jammer records current time t marker as before, but instead of jamming proactively, the jammer listens for a preamble by setting a timer that expires max(T cluster1 ) s later, where max(T cluster1 ) is the maximum interarrival time in cluster1. If a preamble is detected, it jams the ensuing frame; otherwise, if the timer expires, that is, if no preamble is detected, the . jammer sleeps until t marker +T p s before waking up to listen for preambles again. Note that the jammer transmits only random packets, without any preamble.
The aforementioned attack relies on data clustering. A simple algorithm like K-means [McKay 2003 ] is sufficient because of the clear separation between clusters, and the distinctness of each of the clusters. K-means involves only simple multiplications. A 32-bit floating-point hardware-accelerated multiplication (or division) consumes only 9 cycles on a typical sensor node CPU like the MSP430F149 [Texas Instruments 2001] . A K-means iteration consists of an assignment step and an update step [McKay 2003 ]. Denote the number of clusters as K and the number of data samples as N . The assignment step takes K N multiplications, whereas the update step takes K N multiplications and K divisions (having the same cost as multiplications). Assuming multiplication is the most expensive operation, then the computational complexity of a K-means iteration is K (2N + 1) ≈ 4N multiplications, taking K as 2. According to simulations, only 2 iterations are usually required, 3 and above are rare. So for example, if N = 64, the energy required for 2 iterations is at least 4.4 μJ, or 60% of the energy required to transmit 1 bit (7.4 μJ) on a CC1000 radio [Wander et al. 2005] (both MSP430F149 and CC1000 are common components in existing sensor nodes). From the jammer's perspective, the computational cost is likely to be justified since the jammer has nothing else to do apart from jamming. Figure 5 shows clusters that are clearly spaced out at integral multiples of the slot size, typical of a TDMA protocol. However, there might be one or more clusters before the cluster centered on the slot size, depending on the distribution of the data packet length. Unlike S-MAC, clusters at the higher end of the time scale are not negligible, so the jamming algorithm suggested for S-MAC cannot be applied.
LMAC
The jammer's objective is to estimate the slot size by calculating the mean of T S (see Figure 6 ), μ s , and to jam the beginning of every slot. The algorithm is based on two assumptions. The first assumption is that T S can indeed be observed, that is, the probability that at least two occupied slots are consecutive is at least larger than 0.5. Using elementary combinatorics, it can be shown (in Appendix B) that Pr{at least two occupied slots are consecutive}
In Eq.
(1), s (s ≥ 4) is the total number of slots in a frame, and n (0 ≤ n ≤ s) is the number of occupied slots in a frame. When s is even and n = s 2 , the probability is always larger than 0.5. In other words, for a given s, a node is more likely to observe at least two consecutive occupied slots, so long as n, the number of occupied slots, at least satisfies Eq. (2).
For example, if s = 20, the least n that satisfies Eq. (2) is n = 4. Given that most practical WSNs are dense [Akyildiz et al. 2002] , this requirement is almost certainly satisfied. The second assumption is that the shortest data packet might be shorter than a control packet, but the longest data packet must be longer than a control packet. We have
Here L pkt is the random variable representing packet lengths (regardless of packet type), and l ctrl is the fixed length of a control packet. For example, a control packet takes 15 bytes in an optimized implementation (or 23 bytes in our unoptimized implementation), a data packet header takes 7 bytes, and a message authentication code takes 4 bytes, so if a data packet payload is less than 15 − 7 − 4 = 4 bytes (or 12 bytes in our nonoptimized implementation), the corresponding data packet would be shorter than a control packet. The control packets in LMAC are longer than those in S-MAC because they contain more information, like the slot occupancy vector, the number of hops to the gateway, etc. This assumption unfortunately bars us from estimating T S by just measuring the interarrival time between two neighboring shortest packets, since we can no longer be sure if the two neighboring shortest packets are both control packets.
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The algorithm itself consists of the following steps.
(1) Suppose the observed packets are P 0 , P 1 , . . . . Denote the interarrival time between packet P i and packet P i+1 as t i , and the length of packet P i as l i (i = 1, 2, . . .). Store t 1 , t 2 , . . . in the ordered set T , and l 1 , l 2 , . . . in the ordered set L. Had there only been data packets and no control packets, the jammer's job would have been easier, since the slot size is then simply
But there are control packets, so the jammer has to continue as follows. (2) This step is based on two observations. The first is that T S has to be large enough to accommodate both a control packet and a data packet, namely
The last inequality is the result of Eq. (3). Eq. (5) gives a lower bound for the slot size. The second observation is that a slot can accommodate at most 2 packets, so it is always smaller than the sum of 3 contiguous interarrival times, namely
Eq. (6) gives an upper bound for the slot size. Denote the lower bound and upper bound, respectively, as a 0 and a m . (1) is not high enough. For example, if in Figure 5 the probability density at 40 ms (twice the slot size) is higher than the probability density at 20 ms (the slot size), that is, two occupied slots are more likely to be separated by an unoccupied slot than to be consecutive, the estimate is double the real slot size. However, this tends to happen only at the fringe of the network, where the network density is lower. Furthermore, if two occupied slots are indeed more likely to be separated than consecutive, the jammer would not miss much by jamming every two slots instead of every slot. (5) Listen for a packet that is of size μ L . Once received, transmit a jamming packet, and sleep until time = current time − μ L + μ S . It is true that a packet of size μ L might or might not be a control packet, in view of Eq. (3). If the received packet is indeed a control packet, then the jammer is able to synchronize neatly with the LMAC schedule, allowing it to jam the control packet of every slot. If the received packet is not a control packet, however, the jammer's schedule is offset by at least L ctrl + μ L , but is still able to jam the data packet, if there is any, of every slot. (6) Wake up, transmit a jamming packet, and sleep until μ S s later. Repeat this step until that time when periodic re-estimation is required, in which case go to step (1).
We call this algorithm periodic slot-based jamming (PSJ). In the reactive version of the algorithm (RPSJ), the jammer listens for a preamble before jamming instead of jamming proactively.
B-MAC
The probability distribution of packet interarrival times of B-MAC does show some clusters, but they cannot be taken advantage of because B-MAC uses a periodic cycle only for listening, and not sending: We cannot periodically jam something that is not periodically sent. However, it is exactly this periodic listening that the jammer can take advantage of to save energy. Since a B-MAC has to listen every, say, 10 ms, for a valid preamble, the jammer can be sure that if it samples the RSSI every 10 ms, it would be able to hear whatever preamble is being sent. The jamming strategy is hence to find out the check interval the victim nodes are using. This can be achieved by finding out the length of the longest observed preamble. Assuming this observed LPL preamble is T lpl−preamble s long and the length of the normal preamble is T normal−preamble , according to Figure 2 , the jammer should sample the channel every (T lpl−preamble − T normal−preamble ) s. The jammer can either guess a value for T normal−preamble or listen to the channel for the shortest preamble used. If the jammer chooses to guess, to be on the safe side, the jammer should choose a value slightly larger than the typical value, which is 3 to 4 bytes [RF Monolithics 2004] . This is so that the jammer would sample the channel slightly more frequently than do the victim nodes. We call this approach LPL-based jamming (LPLJ).
Discussion
We discuss several potential problems for the jammers. We start by addressing the possibility that the target WSN might be dormant for long periods of time, in which case the jammers described earlier would not appear deployment efficient as they keep listening and expecting to overhear some packets. First, prolonged periods of dormancy highlight the importance of energy conservation, or in other words energy efficiency on the attacker's side, thus providing further support for our work. Secondly, S-MAC and LMAC nodes do generate control packets regularly even when there is no data to be sent. Thirdly, jammer motes can adopt some form of sleep-listen schedule before they synchronize with victim nodes. The sleep-listen schedule is not described here because the MAC protocols themselves already provide a few mechanisms for doing is; the jammer motes only need to incorporate one of those mechanisms. Therefore, our attack can be made deployment efficient, even when the traffic pattern is only sporadic. There are many other ways to enhance our jammers, In this example, mote 69 has to listen for several periods before being able to synchronize with the S-MAC schedule, but it eventually manages to do so. In the plots on the righthand side, the y-axis represents power whereas the x-axis represents time.
but to keep our analysis simple, we try to keep the jammers as basic as possible in our simulations.
The second potential problem might be that when a jammer mote stops for periodic readjustment, legitimate packets might get blocked out by other jammer motes that are still busy jamming. In practice, jammer motes around the same node synchronize with the target node at the same time, so they would stop for readjustment at the same time, such as node A, B, C in Figure 7 (a). Jammer motes around different nodes, such as node C, D in Figure 7 (a), might interfere with each other. Neverthless, when D stops for readjustment, C will eventually be able to synchronize with X , as observed in simulations (Figure 7(b) ). It remains to be seen to what extent synchronization among jammer motes improves their lifetime advantage.
In the next two sections, we will explain how the attacks are simulated before presenting the results. Then we will explore some potential countermeasures.
SIMULATION AND EVALUATION MODEL
All protocols, attacks, and countermeasures are simulated using the OMNeT++ framework (www.omnetpp.org). A simulation consists of a sink node, (N r − 1) router nodes, N s source nodes, and N j jammer motes, all capable of a radio range of r, and located in a square l × l area.
The sink is positioned at the center of the area, under the premise that the attacker does not know the sink is there, whereas the router nodes are pseudorandomly placed at most r from the sink. Both the source nodes and jammer motes are pseudorandomly placed more than r away; this is to deter the jammer motes from having direct effect on the sink and thereby achieve an unfair advantage, as well as to allow us to investigate the effect of jamming on the routing of information from sources to sink. We require the node density to be uniform across the simulation area, namely
)π , to avoid the peculiarities of any specific nonuniform topology having an effect on jamming. In the absence of jammer motes, the network density [Zhang and Hou 2004] 
= N r , that is, equivalent to the number of sink and router nodes. To simulate attacks, the jammer motes are activated 10 s after the sensor network starts operating, to allow the sensor nodes to finish discovering their neighbors and settle down into a steady state before the jamming starts. Hence, we will be simulating the attack scenario described in Section 2. The total simulation time is T sim virtual seconds. Every experiment is run I times, with different seeds each time. The network topology is simulated as static, but is changed with each simulation run. The values of the parameters are summarized in Table I and are chosen to satisfy the constraints of memory and time available for simulations (maximum 900MB of RAM and under 10 actual minutes per run).
On the application layer, the sink node broadcasts an interest once it finds a neighbor, but it only broadcasts the interest once throughout the simulation. The source nodes each broadcast a matching data every 5 s, as an approximation of a network with moderately fast-changing data [Chatterjea et al. 2004] . Note that attack algorithms do not depend on the frequency of these data packets. The data packet payload ranges uniformly from 16 bytes to 100 bytes. The minimum payload corresponds to a TinyDiffision [Mysore et al. 2003 ] payload of 2 attributes (the least number of attributes). The maximum payload is a popular choice [Polastre et al. 2004; van Dam and Langendoen 2003] , and it corresponds to a TinyDiffusion payload of 23 attributes. While a uniform distribution of packet sizes is not realistic, it serves as a base case that allows us to investigate the capability of jammers in reaction to a wide range of packet lengths.
On the network layer, TinyDiffusion [Mysore et al. 2003 ] is faithfully ported from TinyOS (tinyos.sf.net) to be used for S-MAC and B-MAC, whereas LMAC is simulated with its built-in routing protocol. The decision to use different routing protocols is based on the following rationales: (1) In its original implementation, LMAC employs cross-layer optimization across the data link layer and the network layer, so it is awkward to replace its built-in network layer with TinyDiffusion; (2) in our simulation, LMAC's network layer behaves identically to TinyDiffusion. Whether using LMAC's built-in network layer or TinyDiffusion, the principle is to establish gradients for data to flow from the sources to the sink. The comparison of the three MAC protocols should therefore be considered fair. On the data link layer, S-MAC is simulated with adaptive listening [Ye et al. 2003] , with a period of 930 ms and a duty cycle of 10%. The code is also faithfully ported from TinyOS. LMAC is simulated with a fixed slot size of 20 ms (a little more than enough to fit 100-byte payloads) and 20 time slots per frame (suitable for a network density of 20), using the same codebase from our previous work . The B-MAC code is built on top of the LPL code from TU Delft's MAC simulator [Langendoen and Halkes 2005] . Following Polastre et al.'s choice [Polastre et al. 2004] , we use an RSSI sampling time of 350 μs and a check interval of 100 ms for B-MAC. We also implement RTS/CTS signaling on top of the core B MAC protocol. Both S-MAC and B-MAC use a contention time of 41 ms (the default given by the original S-MAC source code).
On the physical layer, Zuniga and Krishnamachari's [2004] model with the parameters in Table II and Table III is used. This model allows us to simulate the gray area effect [Zhao and Govindan 2003 ]. The radio characteristics of the transceivers follow those of the RFM TR1001 [RF Monolithics 2002b] . Notably, switching times are taken into consideration. The 8 to 12-bit data encoding scheme [RF Monolithics 2002a] is assumed, so an encoded data item is 1.5 times the size of the original raw data. Denote T preamble as the time required to transmit a preamble, T byte the time required to transmit one byte, and L pkt the number of bytes in a packet on the data link layer. The total length of a frame (i.e., packet on the physical layer) in time is then given by
The extra 1 byte in the parentheses is to account for the start byte, which is used to align the incoming bit-stream. In the simulation, T preamble = 5T byte and T byte = 10/115200. The extra 2 bits in T byte is to account for 1 start bit and 1 stop bit at the beginning and at the end of a byte.
To simulate jamming, the jammer emits a random packet that is at least T preamble s long if the jamming starts from the start of the preamble. If the jamming starts from the end of the preamble, as is the case with all types of reactive jamming, the jamming packet is only T byte s long. It is assumed that the integrity of a packet is protected by a message authentication code, and a corrupted bit is enough to nullify the validity of the packet; therefore corrupting one byte, or 8 bits (i.e., the minimum that can be transmitted conveniently), should be sufficient to corrupt the whole packet. The width of the jamming pulse has a large impact on the simulation outcomes.
Some aspects of the jammers are as follows. The random jammer is simulated to sleep, and jam for a time is uniformly distributed between 1 ms and 20 ms (this choice will be justified in Section 6). There are several tuneable parameters for PCJ, RPCJ, PSJ, and RPSJ. For example, all PCJ and RPCJ implementations start with a minimum sample size of 64 interarrival times, and readjust their estimation every 8 periods. Tuning these parameters allows the attacker to dynamically adjust its behavior, but the effects of such tunings are left to future investigation. The fact that jammer motes have limited buffer for storing interarrival times and packet lengths is realistically reflected in the implementations. The clustering operations are directly translatable to hardware implementations.
Among those things that are not simulated are: (1) processing delays, and (2) noncircular radio ranges [Reijers et al. 2004] . These are some of the many simplifications that are conventionally applied in simulations.
Metrics
Following our previous work ], we evaluate how effective an attack is by measuring primarily the censorship rate R c and secondarily the attrition rate R a . Specifically, R c measures the fraction of messages blocked. Let M be the number of messages arriving at the sink in the absence of attacks, and M be the number of messages arriving at the sink in the presence of attacks, then
R a measures the fraction of additional energy that the sensor network has to spend in the presence of attacks. Let E be the amount of energy spent when there is no attack, and E be the amount of energy spent when there is attack, then
To evaluate how energy efficient an attack is, we use the effort ratio R e , defined as the ratio of the attacker's per-node energy expenditure to the sensor network's per-node energy expenditure when not under attack. We can compare the effort ratio of a random jammer to that of a reactive jammer as follows. Given the same target protocol, if the power consumption ratio between the sleep, Rx, and Tx mode is 1 : ρ : τ , a reactive jammer that jams j ( j < 1) of the time has a higher effort ratio than a random jammer only when Eq. (10) is satisfied (see Appendix B for derivation).
Plugging-in the values ρ = 960 and τ = 2400 as given previously in Section 5, we get j > 17%. Using R a and R e , we can calculate the lifetime advantage R l of a jammer node over a sensor node, that is, how long a jammer node can live compared to a sensor node. Here, we establish the convention of using the adjective energy efficient to describe a jamming method that has a high lifetime advantage. To derive an expression for R l , the following assumptions are used: (1) a jammer node has the same total amount of energy as a sensor node, and (2) the power usage is constant. There are two scenarios. Eq. (11) is for the scenario where the jammer mote dies first (see Figure 8(a) ).
Eq. (12), is for the scenario where the sensor node dies first (see Figure 8(b) ). In Eq. (12), the ≈ relation is because T start T att ; the ≥ relation is because P att ≤ P att for a jammer mote that has nothing more to jam, consistent with our assumptions of the attack model. Eq. (12) gives only the lower bound, but in cases where the jammer mote outlives the sensor node, knowing the lower bound is good enough.
SIMULATION RESULTS
The censorship rates and lifetime advantages of the various attacks are given in Figures 9 to 12. For readability's sake, the figures for attrition rate and effort ratio are omitted. We start by making some general observations on the results. First, the censorship rates, both the means and the standard errors, generally improve with N j /N s and D (defined in Table I ). This is in line with intuition: More jammer motes have greater jamming effect, and the more sensor nodes a jammer mote has as neighbors, the sooner the jammer mote can synchronize with the S-MAC/LMAC schedule, or determine the preamble length in B-MAC's case. Note that in all simulated cases, N j < N s + N r = N s + D. Therefore, further increases in censorship rate can be expected if we increase the number of jammer motes, N j , to the total number of sensor nodes, N s + N r .
The second general observation is that our jamming algorithms generally outperform random jamming and reactive jamming in lifetime advantage, as expected, since random jamming is not a targeted effort, and reactive jamming consumes energy constantly in listening. Thirdly, although it appears in Figures 9, 11 , and 12 that random jamming is equally effective against all three protocols, the results are to be interpreted with care. Had we chosen a different value for the maximum Tx/sleep duration, we would have gotten potentially different censorship rates. Picking 20 ms as the maximum Tx/sleep duration allows random jamming to achieve 100% censorship rate at a high probability for all three protocols (see Figure 18 in Appendix B). The second reason to pick 20 ms as the maximum Tx/sleep duration is that our LMAC implementation uses a slot size of 20 ms: A maximum Tx/sleep duration of 20 ms ensures that every slot gets jammed.
Finishing our general observations, we now analyze the results in more detail.
S-MAC
We compare random jamming and reactive jamming with the following energyefficient attacks: listen interval jamming (LIJ), control interval jamming (CIJ), data packet jamming (DPJ), periodic cluster-based jamming (PCJ), and reactive periodic cluster-based jamming (RPCJ). LIJ, CIJ, and DPJ are three jamming algorithms we introduced in our previous work ] that work on unencrypted packets. As their names imply, LIJ jams the listen interval of an S-MAC schedule; CIJ jams the control interval; DPJ waits for a CTS packet and jams the ensuing data packet. We classify LIJ, CIJ, and DPJ as detailed knowledge attacks, and PCJ and RPCJ as minimal knowledge attacks. We suggest for future work to compare the latest minimal knowledge attacks with existing detailed knowledge attacks .
Censorship rate. Random jamming and reactive jamming have the highest censorship rates. Among the energy-efficient attacks, DPJ has the highest censorship rate. We observe a peculiar trend with LIJ and CIJ: Their censorship rates first decrease then increase with N j /N s . The reason is as follows. Increasing N j /N s has two conflicting effects: (1) jammer motes find it harder to get two SYNC packets to synchronize with the S-MAC schedule; and (2) jammer motes can jam more sensor nodes with each transmission. As N j /N s increases, the first effect dominates initially, but later the second effect becomes more pervasive. This explains the peculiar trend with LIJ and CIJ. Due to this peculiar trend, PCJ and RPCJ become more effective than LIJ and CIJ, starting from N j /N s = 0.5. This result has an important implication: PCJ and RPCJ are able to achieve a better a censorship rate even without insider information.
Lifetime advantage. Figure 10 agrees with the result of our previous work ] that among the detailed knowledge attacks, CIJ has the overall highest lifetime advantage, followed by LIJ. Among the remaining attacks, PCJ has the highest lifetime advantage, followed by the intelligent reactive jamming methods DPJ and RPCJ, which score similar lifetime advantages. Random jamming starts out with low lifetime advantages at small values of N j /N s but becomes more energy efficient with larger N j /N s to the extent that it becomes as energy efficient as RPCJ at large N j /N s . Random jamming is only expected to become more energy efficient as N j /N s or D increases because it becomes more disruptive without extra effort when there are more jammer motes in the network or the nodes are closer together. In fact, additionally, against S-MAC, the lifetime advantage of random jamming increases with the maximum Tx/sleep duration (see Figure 18 ). Therefore an attacker can choose to sacrifice a small amount of censorship rate by increasing the maximum Tx/sleep duration to squeeze more lifetime advantage out of its attack. The previous observation implies that in the absence of detailed knowledge about an S-MAC implementation, an attacker can either choose to deploy few PCJ jammer motes (for cost), or many random jammer motes (for simplicity) to achieve comparable lifetime advantage. The following are more detailed observations of the various jammers.
LIJ's and CIJ's lifetime advantages have large standard deviations because in LIJ, and to a lesser extent in CIJ, the SYNC packets are jammed. Jammer motes that have too few sensor nodes or too many fellow jammer motes as neighbors would take a long time, if ever, to get hold of two SYNC packets to synchronize with the S-MAC schedule. This in turn makes the censorship rate of LIJ highly topology dependent: Those topologies that have more uniform distribution of jammer motes would register much higher lifetime advantage. This results in a mixture of low and high lifetime advantages and hence large standard deviations. For both PCJ and RPCJ, the lifetime advantage drops slightly as N j /N s increases, as it becomes harder to synchronize with the S-MAC schedule. The lifetime advantage of PCJ increases slightly with network density. The lifetime advantage of RPCJ, on the other hand, hardly changes with network density because the jammer spends more time listening than transmitting but the time spent on listening is roughly the duration of the listen interval, which does not change with network density.
A random jammer transmits for half of the time, and sleeps for half of the time. A reactive jammer transmits at most 10% of the time, and listens for at least 90% of the time due to the 10% duty cycle. Based on these values alone, comparing the energy consumptions using Eq. (10) tells us that reactive jamming has a lower effort ratio. However, random jamming has a far higher attrition rate because it makes some victim nodes stay in backoff state in listening mode throughout the sleep interval, and therefore has a higher lifetime advantage than does reactive jamming.
To summarize, the high censorship rate and high lifetime advantage of CIJ indicates the importance of link-layer encryption. However, encryption alone is insufficient, as the temporal arrangement of the packets induced by the nature of the protocol still allows PCJ and RPCJ to be effective and energy efficient. In practice, without detailed knowledge about the S-MAC implementation, an attacker can either choose to deploy few PCJ jammer motes (for cost), or many random jammer motes (for simplicity) to launch a successful attack.
LMAC
We compare random jamming and reactive jamming with PSJ and RPSJ.
Censorship rate. Starting from N j /N s = 0.5, the censorship rates of PSJ and RPSJ are close to 100%. At these values of N j /N s , both are comparable, and both are more effective against LMAC than PCJ and RPCJ are against S-MAC. This is because the slot size can be estimated more accurately than the period of an S-MAC schedule.
Lifetime advantage. Both PSJ and RPSJ have almost twice the lifetime advantages of random jamming and reactive jamming. Looking more carefully, RPSJ has a higher lifetime advantage than PSJ. This is because not all slots in a frame are necessarily occupied, and when a slot is unoccupied, the energy RPSJ spends on listening is lower than the energy PSJ spends on transmitting.
As the network becomes denser, more slots in a frame are occupied, the effort ratios of both PSJ and RPSJ become higher, and hence their lifetime advantages decrease with network density. This trend should stop when all the slots in a frame are occupied.
Random jamming does not make LMAC nodes monitor the channel more than they usually do, unlike the case with S-MAC. For S-MAC, the sensor nodes only listen for at most a small fraction of the slot size, and as packets are jammed, less energy is used on propagating the packets to the sink, resulting in a negative attrition rate. One note of caution, though: Had the jamming been allowed to start before the LMAC nodes synchronize with each other, the results would have been different because then the LMAC nodes would have had to constantly listen for broadcast schedules. This in turn would have resulted in a large positive attrition rate, and hence lifetime advantage. Since reactive jamming transmits at most 2 bytes (1 byte to jam a control packet, another 1 byte to jam a data packet), or 174 μs per 20 ms slot, it does not satisfy Eq. (10) and hence has a lower effort ratio than random jamming. In fact, reactive jamming will only have a higher effort ratio when the slot size is 1 ms according to Eq. (10), which is unrealistic. With their attrition effects being similar, reactive jamming has a higher lifetime advantage than random jamming.
To summarize, PSJ and RPSJ have high censorship rates and lifetime advantages. Coupled with ease of implementation, they are genuine threats to LMAC, even when packets are encrypted.
B-MAC
We compare random jamming and reactive jamming with LPLJ. By design, LPLJ is reactive jamming with optimized listening, so it is only intuitive that LPLJ has similar censorship rates as reactive jamming, but far higher lifetime advantages than reactive jamming. The lifetime advantage of LPLJ, however, decreases with network density due to the following reason.
As the network gets increasingly dense, a jammer mote gets not only more sensor nodes but also more jammer motes as its neighbors. More neighboring sensor nodes means more packets to jam. More neighboring jammer motes means staying awake more often because whenever a signal is detected on the channel, a jammer mote always stays awake for a while to listen for a valid preamble. Consequently, a jammer mote has a higher effort ratio in a denser network, and, according to Eq. (11) and Eq. (12), the lifetime advantage becomes lower. The lifetime advantages of random jamming are comparable to reactive jamming, that is, significantly lower than those of LPLJ.
To summarize, since LPLJ is trivial to implement and yet allows the jammer motes to live as long as or longer than the victim nodes, it is a devastating threat to B-MAC even when the packets are encrypted.
IMPLICATIONS TO OTHER PROTOCOLS
We now look at the implications of the aforesaid findings to other protocols. As explained in Section 3, we only concentrate on the MAC protocols that: (1) use a single channel, and (2) listen instead of follow some schedule to receive messages. Among these protocols, there are protocols that use: (1) slots, (2) frames, or (3) random access to organize medium accesses, using the taxonomy in Langendoen and Halkes [2005] . Examples that use slots, frames, and random access are S-MAC, LMAC, and B-MAC, respectively, which we have just investigated. We now look at other protocols that belong to each of the three categories, starting with slot-based protocols. We pick these protocols from Langendoen and Halkes [2005] .
Slot-Based Protocols
Slot-based protocols include T-MAC [van Dam and Langendoen 2003 ] and DMAC [Lu et al. 2004] . Since T-MAC is derived from S-MAC, PCJ and RPCJ are applicable to T-MAC. The fact that T-MAC has a dynamic duty cycle offers some relief. This is because, even though PCJ and RPCJ are able to adapt to the dynamic duty cycle through periodic readjustments, they would be effective and efficient against T-MAC than against S-MAC due to the need for more frequent readjustments.
Like T-MAC, DMAC is a slotted protocol that uses a dynamic duty cycle, but unlike T-MAC, it offsets the schedule of a node depending on the number of hops the node is away from the sink, in order to minimize latency (see Figure 13(a) ). For example, if the node is i hops away, its schedule is offset by +T Rx compared with the schedule of a node i +1 hops away. The following cluster pattern should emerge on the probability distribution of the packet interarrival times: cluster1 has a mean of T Tx and cluster2 has a mean of T sleep . Based on these clusters, PCJ and RPCJ can then be applied.
Frame-Based Protocols
Frame-based protocols include PACT [Pei and Chien 2001] , Arisha [Arisha et al. 2002] , TRAMA [Rajendran et al. 2003 ], BMA [Li and Lazarou 2004] , and SS-TDMA [Kulkarni and Arumugam 2004] . These are TDMA protocols. The primary means of jamming these protocols is by way of estimating the slot size. To estimate the slot size, the jammer needs to be able to observe two consecutive slots, that is, the number of slots and the number of occupied slots in a frame need to satisfy Eq. (2). This requirement is typically satisfied as explained in Section 4.2 and will not be mentioned again in the discussion that follows.
We start with SS-TDMA. SS-TDMA relies on the nodes being arranged in a rectangular or hexagonal rid. Due to the lack of control packets, SS-TDMA is easier to attack than LMAC since Eq. (4) alone allows us to estimate the slot size.
Since both PACT and BMA use clustering to distribute TDMA schedules and both use similar frame structures, we only discuss BMA and extend our findings for BMA to PACT. In BMA, the network is partitioned into clusters. Every network starts with the cluster setup phase, where every node decides whether to become a clusterhead. At the end of this phase, clusters are formed and the network enters the steady-state phase. By this time, every clusterhead already knows the number of members in its cluster. The steady-state phase is a sequence of sessions or frames. A session in turn consists of a contention period, a data transmission period, and an idle period, and each of these are slotted (see Figure 13(b) ).
The so-called contention period allows the nodes to tell the clusterhead, in their assigned slot, their transmission schedules. Since the clusterhead already knows the number of nodes in the cluster, n, the number of slots in the contention period is exactly n. The data transmission period and idle period have a variable number of slots, but each session has a fixed length so that when there is more data to send, the number of data transmission slots is increased while the number of idle slots is decreased accordingly. Since the control packets and data packets occupy separate slots of their own, Eq. (4) can be applied to estimate T contention and T data . In the contention period, interarrival times are shorter than those in the data transmission period. This is how the jammer can tell whether it is in the contention period or the data transmission period. PSJ and RPSJ can now be applied to jam the contention period and the data transmission period, each with a different estimated slot size.
Arisha partitions the network into clusters, and in each cluster there is a gateway that arbitrates medium access among sensors and sets routes for sensor data. Arisha divides time into phases, the most important of which are the data transfer phase and reroute phase (see Figure 13(c) ). A phase is in turn made of frames. A data transfer frame has a bigger slot size than a reroute frame, namely T data > T reroute . A similar approach to jamming BMA, as explained before, can be applied to jamming Arisha.
TRAMA divides time into alternating periods of random access and scheduled access. Both periods are slotted. A slot in the random access period is called a signaling slot, while a slot in the scheduled access period is called a transmission slot. Denote the size of a signaling slot as T signalling , and the size of a transmission slot as T Tx , then for ease of synchronization, T Tx is typically a multiple T signalling (e.g., T Tx = 7T signalling [Rajendran et al. 2003] ). Again, a similar approach to jamming BMA can be applied to jamming TRAMA.
Random-Access-Based Protocols
Random-access-based protocols include low-power listening [Hill and Culler 2002] , PCM [Jung and Vaidya 2002] , Sift [Jamieson et al. 2003 ], and WiseMAC [El-Hoiydi et al. 2003 ].
Low-power listening is to all our intents and purposes equivalent to B-MAC, so we will not discuss it any further. PCM is an improvement to IEEE 802.11 by exercising power control on a per-packet basis. Sift is a contention-windowbased MAC protocol. Since they do not specify any duty cycle, they offer no obvious exploits to PCJ, RPCJ, PSJ, RPSJ, or LPLJ. But since they do not have any duty cycle, it remains to be seen how suitable they are, or how they can be adapted for WSNs.
WiseMAC uses the same preamble sampling scheme as B-MAC, with the difference being that if the sender knows the schedule of the receiver, it waits until the receiver is about to wake up and sends its packet with a normal, shorter preamble, instead of an LPL preamble. However, for broadcasting packets, the sender often has to stretch the preamble to the full length of the LPL preamble [Langendoen and Halkes 2005] . Therefore, given enough broadcast traffic, the jammer is still able to figure out the check interval and apply LPLJ.
Discussion
Summing up, all protocols from the survey of Langendoen and Halkes [2005] that we have discussed have weaknesses due to their organization of medium accesses. Among these protocols, frame-based protocols have better resistance to energy-efficient jamming because they spread out transmissions in time. Fortunately, more frame-based protocols than any other type of protocol have been proposed in literature. In the next section, we explore some countermeasures.
COUNTERMEASURES
In this section, we discuss potential countermeasures against attacks for each of the categories of MAC protocols. Like any other security countermeasure, any solution proposed here would increase the energy cost, but the solution is acceptable so long as even under the most efficient attack, the network would sustain a censorship rate of less than 50% and would outlive the jammer motes.
S-MAC
Since our attacks against S-MAC are based on clustering, a countermeasure would naturally be to prevent clustering-based analysis from being feasible. This can be done by narrowing the distance between cluster1 and cluster2. Assuming no packet is transmitted in the sleep interval, the biggest possible cluster1 interarrival time is the length of the listen interval, whereas the smallest possible cluster2 interarrival time is the length of the sleep interval. We can "stick" cluster1 and cluster2 together by equating the biggest cluster1 interarrival time to the smallest cluster2 interarrival time, which is tantamount to setting the duty cycle to 50%.
According to simulations (see Figure 14) , this defence is effective against PCJ for N j /N s ≤ 0.5 if K-means is used as the clustering algorithm. However, the countermeasure is not effective if the jammer motes use Expectation Maximization (EM) [Dempster et al. 1977] as the clustering algorithm.
Relief can be found in the fact that a jammer using EM would considerably deteriorate its own lifetime advantage because EM is a computationally expensive and hence energy-consuming algorithm that involves multiple exponentiations. On the other hand, a duty cycle of 50% may not be energy efficient enough for most WSNs that are characterized by low data rate [Polastre et al. 2004] . Overall, using a high duty cycle is a partial countermeasure to energy-efficient link-layer jamming.
LMAC
In the case of LMAC, we mentioned that it is advantageous to spread transmissions out in time, but as long as we transmit at fixed slot sizes (i.e., fixed intervals), spikes would manifest on the probability distribution graph of the packet interarrival times. The strategy of flattening the spikes to increase the difficulty in estimating the slot size can be served by changing the slot size pseudorandomly as a function of time and a hidden seed. Note that this method has a negative impact on the bandwidth of the protocol.
For example, if the sensor nodes change their slot size every second, by pseudorandomly picking a value from the range [20 ms, 30 ms], then according to simulations, a jammer using PSJ can still achieve a censorship rate of 80% (with standard error 12%) and a lifetime advantage of 47% (with standard error 5%) when N j /N s = 1 and D = 20.
When we change the slot size (on a per slot basis) by incrementing the size with 25% until reaching two times the original size is reached and then decrement with 25% until reaching the original size again, the censorship rate of a PSJ jammer remains 80% (with standard error 14%), but the lifetime advantage decreases to 40% (with standard error 5%). The distribution of packet interarrival times is shown in Figure 15 .
Remarkable of this countermeasure is the RPSJ censorship: only 35% (with standard error 15%). The reason for this effect is that the RPSJ method of attacking listens for a preamble before jamming, and a jammer is only efficient when it starts to receive just before a packet is transmitted. When it wakes during the transmission of a packet or afterwards (what we try to achieve with . this countermeasure), it waits in receive mode until the next preamble, hence wasting energy. The PSJ attack does not suffer from this effect.
Note that the aforementioned countermeasure has deterministic behaviors which makes it less suitable for our purposes. However, in Section 9 we implement it on sensor node prototypes to show its effect in practice.
The previously described countermeasures are less than satisfactory. We succeed in fouling the attackers in the estimations they make of the slot size by flattening out spikes in the probability distribution of interarrival times. In the big picture, however, this misses its goal. The fact that PSJ attackers have more than one opportunity to jam a packet, due to the multi-hop communication to the sink node, makes them robust and effective in jamming.
In the following scenario, we make the LMAC protocol more persistent in delivering messages by doubling the number of retries the LMAC protocol does before discarding packets. As a matter of fact, LMAC, without countermeasure and the number of retries set to 6, has no effect on censorship rate. With countermeasure, however, the PSJ censorship rate R c drops to 65% (with standard error 14%). When we further decrease the effect of the attackers by reducing them in number, the censorship rates drop to 51% (with standard error 9%) and R c = 38% (with standard error 25%), for N j /N s = 0.75 and N j /N s = 0.50, respectively. The conclusion is that an attacker cannot be thrifty about deploying jammer motes.
In the previously discussed results, the data packet payload ranges uniformly from 16 to 100 bytes. Large payloads give the PSJ attacker more opportunity (i.e., higher probability) to jam the packet. We simulate attacks with fixed data packet payload of 28 bytes. The censorship rates for PSJ are R c = 49% and R c = 29%, for N j /N s = 1.00 and N j /N s = 0.75, respectively. Thus to avoid effective attacks, shorter data packets should be preferred.
B-MAC
For B-MAC, it is not clear how to prevent attacks because B-MAC relies on the preamble being long enough for the receivers to detect. Shortening the preamble any further than what we have simulated, 10 ms, which is the minimum considered by Polastre et al. [2004] , defeats the purpose of B-MAC.
Discussion
From the preceding discussion, it appears for now that an effective countermeasure is lacking, but by comparing the censorship rate and lifetime advantage of the best attack on the respective protocols, LMAC emerges as a better choice than S-MAC and B-MAC in terms of resistance against link-layer jamming. Generalizing this observation, TDMA protocols are potentially a better choice than other types of protocols.
This concludes the presentation of our simulated attacks and countermeasures for the three main classes of MAC protocols.
VALIDATION
To validate our simulation results, we implement LMAC and its most effective jammer (PSJ) on prototype sensor node hardware. We only experiment on LMAC because LMAC in its original form is least vulnerable to our jamming attacks, and its countermeasure works best: Among the three protocols, LMAC is our recommendation for practical applications.
Implementation
For practical reasons, the following changes with respect to our simulation model are considered. Firstly we test the effectiveness of jamming and countermeasure in a single, hop network. The jammer node is in radio range of the sink node and therefore we expect the censorship rate to be 100% for an effective jammer.
Secondly, we consider a three-node network (i.e., one sink node and two wellbehaved nodes), which uses a frame length of four slots (i.e., the probability of two consecutive slots is 1). Each slot takes 1/16 s, roughly a factor 3 larger than in simulation, 2 but is more practical to implement, since it allows for sufficient time to process the packets and to prepare the transceiver to transmit the data. These steps are not considered in our simulations, but cannot be omitted on our prototype sensor nodes.
Thirdly, our prototypes are based upon the hardware described in van Hoesel et al. [2003] . The sensor node has a 16-bit Texas Instruments MSP430F149 core. It has 60 [Kbytes of program memory and 2] Kbytes of data memory. When running at full speed (5 MHz), the processor consumes approximately 1.5 mW, but it also has several power-saving modes. The node originally features a RFM TR1001 transceiver, but we now use a Nordic nRF905 transceiver [Nordic Semiconductor ASA 2005] for the following reason. The Nordic transceiver releases the processor from time-critical control, like the generation of the preamble and the alignment of the incoming bit-stream. This results in better performance of communication between nodes. However, the transceiver has slightly different properties as those assumed in our simulation model. The transceiver denies us the opportunity to transmit the short jamming packets as proposed in Section 5. The jamming is done by transmitting a packet consisting of a preamble, address, payload of 1 byte, and a checksum. A smaller packet cannot be transmitted by the transceiver hardware.
Finally, we let the PSJ observe the packet interarrival times for control packets only, due to two reasons: (1) the used transceiver filters the packets on type, length, and validity before handing over to the processor; and (2) our countermeasure for LMAC leaves the gap T gap between control and data packet untouched. Therefore, an attacker might estimate this gap accurately, since it would show up in the probability distribution of packet interarrival times. Thus, the attacker might, based on this information, distinguish between the two packet types. We let the PSJ observe 8 interarrival times before letting it estimate the slot size.
The implementation of the PSJ attacker consumes, on top of the DCOS kernel and drivers [Hofmeijer et al. 2004] , 1520 bytes of program memory, including debugging code that allows us to get insight on the estimated slot interval via serial link to the jamming node.
In our experiments, the sink node keeps track of correctly received data packets by recording their sequence number. This allows us to detect missing packets and thus to calculate censorship rate R c . Both remaining well-behaved nodes transmit 16-byte data packets every s. When a data packet is not acknowledged by the sink node, it is scheduled for retry. However, when it fails to be delivered within three retries, the packet is simply discarded. In a test without attacker, we verified that all generated data packets arrive in the sink node.
Experiments
First, we test the effect of jamming in an LMAC setting without countermeasures. The experiments show that jamming is effective; no communication between nodes and sink is possible when the jammer is active (i.e., R c = 100%). Using a similar setting in our simulation model results in R c = 97%. A closer inspection shows that the 3% difference is caused by the packets that reach the sink before the simulated PSJ attacker has established an estimate of the slot size.
When the PSJ estimates the slot size incorrectly, the nodes are able to communicate again after the transmission of the jammer has drifted to the gap between the data packet and the control packet of the next slot, missing its jamming effect. This effect occurred in one of ten experiments. It implies that the jammer node must resynchronize frequently to ensure effective jamming. Our simulation model does not account for drifting.
Another observation is that when nodes are closely situated together and the attacker is relatively far away from the cluster, the LMAC packets are not disrupted by the jammer node while it is still in radio range. Apparently, the demodulation scheme of the transceiver is robust against interfering signals with lower signal strength. This makes it harder for jammers to compromise a wireless sensor network, since it requires them to transmit at high power level or to use specialized hardware.
In the next experiment, LMAC is extended with the countermeasure discussed in Section 8.2. For this purpose, we extend the control packet of LMAC with one byte used as a "hidden" seed for the countermeasure. At the end of each slot, this value is incremented by one, advancing to the next table entry that contains the 25% increment and decrement steps of the slot size. By receiving one control packet correctly, a node is able to calculate all future steps of the countermeasure scheme.
Compared to the simulations in Section 8.2, our implementation on sensor nodes uses only a small portion of the slot to actually transmit the control and data packets. This dramatically reduces the probability that an attacker jams a packet, certainly when its estimate of the slot size does not match reality. Therefore, our countermeasure against the PSJ attack is, in this setting, quite effective. We observe a censorship rate of R c = 2% (32 of 1532 data packets were successfully jammed). In the trace of successful received messages in the sink, we see that the jammer is sometimes successful in disturbing a packet; however, in most cases the acknowledgement mechanism in LMAC is able to recover the packet in one of the retries. Similar effects are observed in the simulation results of this scenario. Our simulator model reported a censorship rate of R c = 0%.
Discussion
Our experiments validate our simulations on the following aspects: (1) packets can be nullified with short jamming packets and (2) censorship rates match with the experiments in a small network. Although the validation of the simulation model is not complete, some interesting points have been brought to our attention: (1) Processing delays, and (2) timing imperfections of jammers cannot be neglected. These effects are not taken into account in our simulation model. It is our future work to extend and validate the simulation model in more detail.
In addition, we showed that LMAC without countermeasure can be effectively jammed. This shows the importance of keeping potential link-layer attacks in mind when designing a MAC protocol.
RELATED WORK
Wood and Stankovic wrote in 2002 that no effective defence was yet known against link-layer jamming [Wood and Stankovic 2002] . Ståhlberg [2000] and Wood and Stankovic [2002] quote how an attacker might keep sending RTS packets to elicit CTS packets from its victims. Negi and Perrig [2003] investigate the attack of a jammer that detects and jams RTS packets, as well as sends RTS packets to reserve the largest time interval possible, using the Poisson arrival model. This type of jammer needs to be an insider of the network in order to know the content of the packets, and also send RTS packets that can pass the integrity check by normal sensor nodes. Our attackers are not bound by such an assumption. Moreover, if the RTS packet is short enough, the jammer may not have enough time to respond [Xu et al. 2005] . Jamming the ensuing CTS or data packets might be a more successful attack . Konorski [2002] proposes a scheduling policy that addresses the selfish behavior of using small or no contention time (also called random backoff time) in contention-based protocols, in the context of single-hop networks. We are only interested in multihop networks. Kyasanur and Vaidya [2003] propose that instead of letting the sender set the contention time, the receiver sets and sends the time in the CTS and ACK packets to the sender. The sender uses this assigned contention time in the subsequent transmission to the receiver. The receiver can then tell if the sender is being selfish, that is, using a value smaller than the assigned value, by observing the number of idle slots between consecutive transmissions from the sender. The problem with this approach is that if the receiver misbehaves, the sender is penalized. Cárdenas et al. [2004] propose using Blum's coin-flipping protocol [Blum 1983 ] to ensure that the sender and the receiver choose a random backoff time such that if either the sender or the receiver deviates from the random backoff, the other party would know. Cagalj et al. [2004] investigate the effect of a group of selfish cheaters from a game-theoretic viewpoint. We focus on DoS attacks, in which the purpose of the misbehaving party lies in disruption instead of getting more bandwidth. Different countermeasures are thus required. Xu et al. [2004] propose two evasion strategies against constant jammers: (1) channel surfing and (2) spatial retreat. Channel surfing is essentially an adaptive form of frequency hopping. Instead of continuously hopping from frequency to frequency, a node only switches to a different frequency when it discovers the current frequency is being jammed. Channel surfing comes in two forms: (1) Either the whole network switches to the frequency, or (2) only those nodes in the jammed region switch to the new frequency while nodes at the region boundary constantly switch between the new and old frequency to keep the network connected [Xu et al. 2007 ]. Spatial retreat is an algorithm according to which two nodes move in Manhattan distances to escape from a jammed region. The algorithm is more suitable for wireless sensor and actor networks (WSANs) [Akyildiz and Kasimoglu 2004] than conventional WSNs. The algorithms are effective against constant jammers, but we are motivated to look at jammers who are more intelligent than constant jammers. Čagalj et al. [2007] propose three antijamming techniques that are based on establishing wormholes probabilistically from within the jammed region to the network operator: (1) by wiring some pairs of the nodes; (2) by equipping some nodes with a spare frequency-hopping Bluetooth radio; and (3) by hopping asynchronously to other channels once jamming is detected.
We mentioned the four generic jammer models by Xu et al. [2005] earlier. Based on the models, Xu et al. show that neither received signal strength indication (RSSI) or carrier sensing time alone is sufficient in detecting all four types of jammers. Instead, attacks can be detected by measuring: (1) both the packet delivery ratio and the signal strength; or (2) both the packet delivery ratio and the location. In our previous work , we look at potential attacks on one particular MAC protocol, S-MAC, and provide a countermeasure.
Instead of looking at the packet delivery ratio of individual nodes, we look at the effect of distributed jammer motes on the WSN as a whole. We take a step further by seeing that for sustainable jamming, jamming efficiency is a definite constraint for attackers. For this reason, while Xu et al. provide metrics for measuring the quality of service of individual nodes, we provide metrics for measuring the jamming effectiveness and efficiency of the jammers. Xu et al.'s work and ours are complementary in the sense that their approach is protocolagnostic, while we target jammers that try to optimize their energy efficiency. This work extends our previous work ] to more protocols and in a more general setting (the latest attacks work even on encrypted traffic, while the earlier attacks do not).
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We start out with the observation that energy-efficient link-layer jamming is a real threat on wireless sensor network MAC protocols. With this observation in mind, we identify three representative protocols: S-MAC, LMAC, and B-MAC, and investigate their resistance against our efficiency-oriented jamming algorithms. Our algorithms are designed such that the jammers always aim to concentrate their "firepower" at critical time instances, that is, when the victim sensor nodes transmit packets. To aid our study, we propose new metrics (censorship rate, attrition rate, effort ratio, and lifetime advantage) to measure the effectiveness and energy efficiency of these jamming algorithms. We employ both simulations and hardware implementation in our measurements. Our simulations use a complete network stack and model path loss and interference as realistically as possible. In our study, we use the brute-force methods of random jamming and reactive jamming for comparison.
Our study reveals that against S-MAC, a practical attack can consist of either a few PCJ jammer motes or many random jammer motes. S-MAC is particularly vulnerable to random jamming. In earlier work we investigated link-layer jamming based on detailed knowledge of MAC protocols. The surprising discovery is that our minimal-knowledge-based PCJ algorithm can be more effective than some of the detailed knowledge attacks in some cases. To attack LMAC, both PSJ and RPSJ are not only effective but also almost twice as energy efficient as random/reactive jamming. Our LPL-based jamming against B-MAC is not only able to achieve the censorship rate of reactive jamming, but also an average lifetime advantage of 120% for dense networks. The implication of this is that B-MAC should be ruled out for applications where denial-ofservice attacks are a concern. Since the lifetime advantages of random jamming and PCJ against S-MAC are higher than the lifetime advantages of PSJ and RPSJ against LMAC, LMAC is the preferred protocol in terms of jamming resistance.
For this reason, we implement LMAC and its most effective jammer on our sensor node prototype hardware to validate our simulation model. The censorship rates match our simulations in a four-node topology. Learning from our experiments, we point out that timing aspects, like drift in jammer motes, deserve more attention in simulation models.
With the typical WSN systems in use today, no effective measures against link-layer jamming are available. For WSNs that require high security against link-layer jamming we recommend: (1) use of spread spectrum hardware, (2) use of a TDMA protocol, (3) use of randomized transmission intervals, and (4) ideally, encrypting link-layer packets to ensure a high entry barrier for jammers (it is possible using TinySec to limit the additional energy consumption to about 10% [Karlof et al. 2004] ).
Our first future work is to establish analytically the desirable characteristics of MAC protocols that are secure against link-layer jamming attacks. A practical countermeasure should include an attack detection mechanism such that when there is no attack, the sensor nodes would use a more efficient version of the MAC protocol, but when an attack is detected would resort to a more robust version of the protocol.
We only focus on the nature of our jamming algorithms and the basic countermeasures to these attacks in this article. An extension to this work is not only to detect these attacks but also to respond proactively to them, say, by trying to mislead the attackers. Naturally, it is always possible to mislead the attackers by making certain assumptions about how they might behave. For example, we can assume that attackers only target one MAC protocol. Under this assumption, a WSN can switch to another MAC protocol once it detects an attack, but by doing so, the sensor nodes might need to double (loosely speaking) the code space required for the data link layer. The fact remains that in this eternal cat and mouse game between defender and attacker, it is equally possible for attackers to change their strategy dynamically. It is definitely our future plan to take this study a step further to see what proactive countermeasures a WSN can take.
In terms of validation, the experiments are to be extended to S-MAC, especially to study how network density increases the variance of the clusters (see Figure 3 ) in practice. A larger network should also be used to make the results more representative.
